The American involvement in Vietnam in the period from 1961 through to 1968 was the culmination of a number of influences and factors which allowed the United States to take part in one of its costliest, most tragic, and easily most unpopular foreign wars in its entire history.¹ Although the U. S did not completely withdraw from Vietnam until 1975, it escalated its contribution to the South from 1961 to 1968, and followed a similar policy line throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This position dramatically changed after the 1968 Tet offensive and subsequent election of Richard Nixon as President the following year. In analyzing the history of America's response to this war, it is imperative to consider the reasons why she entered the war, what the justification was behind her policy during the war, and finally why the United States could only achieve limited success up to the turning point in 1968. Many wide and differing opinions exist on this chapter in America's history, and whilst some authors can be identified to fit into one of the three major schools of debate on U. S foreign policy -Realist, National Liberal and New Left- others are not as clearly aligned, and yet deserve our attention nonetheless.²

The United States' first involvement in the Indo-China region dates back as early as 1941 in the Second World War where it provided limited aid to the Vietminh to help fight the Japanese. American activity increased in the 1950's, however, where Cold War politics and the "containment" policy as laid down in the Truman doctrine of 1947 dictated that America should do its utmost to help the troubled French re-establish themselves in their colony of Vietnam, particularly in light of the "loss" of nearby China to communism.³ After Diembienphu and the Geneva Conference in 1954, where Vietnam was divided at the seventeenth parallel with the Communists in the North and U. S backed government of Diem in the South, the United States increased its role in Vietnam in attempting to remove pro-communist elements in the South, and it was this policy stance which was dealt with and carried through in the Presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson.

From this initial view, then, it seems clear that we can account for a large proportion of America's response to the Indo-China War as a logical extension of Cold War and containment policy, and there appears to be a general consensus among writers on this period that this was the case.⁴ Soviet-American confrontation had intensified during the 1950's, and the rise of communist China sparked a new fear for the U.S of the combined, monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc (though a split between these two nations later exposed this myth).⁵ Throughout the war, the major concern remained that of preventing the loss of South Vietnam to communism,⁶and this was particularly clear in the rhetoric of the two Presidents until 1968, especially with the emphasis upon the "domino theory", which suggested that Communist takeover of one country would automatically lead to Communist takeovers in neighboring States, and in the case of Vietnam, eventually as far as India, Australia and New Zealand.⁷

George Herring states that the new administration of John F Kennedy accepted "without question the basic assumptions of the containment policy", and that they "...shared a Wilsonian view that destiny had singled out their nation to defend and spread the democratic ideal."⁸ That the containment policy and domino theory were at the heart of American involvement in the Kennedy years up to 1963 is beyond doubt. Kennedy and his advisory team of brilliant academics including McNamara, Rusk, Ball, Rostow, and the Bundy brothers were strongly committed to preventing Vietnam's fall into Chinese hands and this is reflected in their directives and policy initiatives which pursued the position of their predecessors to help Vietnam become a stable, constitutional democracy.⁹ Setbacks in Cuba and Laos, and problems in Berlin during this period also highlighted the importance of Vietnam to America's interests.

Kennedy took a much more limited and cautious approach to Vietnam than had been suggested by the Eisenhower and Dulles Administration a few years earlier, yet it was not Eisenhower but the Democratic Presidents Kennedy and Johnson who "...took the existential leap into the jungles of Vietnam."¹⁰ Kennedy's contributions of financial and military aid to the South were gradually increased during his Presidency, originally in early 1961 consisting of direct monetary aid to the ARVN, and also with the provision of only a few hundred military and strategic advisors to the South, generally on the condition that the unstable Diem government guarantee political reform.¹¹ Pre-occupied with the urgent situation in Berlin, however, Kennedy did not allow any substantial movement towards further dramatic increases in support until the end of 1961 with "Project Beefup" and the Strategic Hamlet Program, when it became clear that the first provisions had been of little use (the Vietcong's infiltration in the South had doubled by the end of the year). Against the advice of intelligence reports that emphasized the ineffectiveness of Diem and also the resources, strength and will of the growing communist forces, the President continued to expand the American contribution and defense budget into 1962, with emphasis on deploying secret counter-insurgency teams into North Vietnam, initially under the guise of "flood relief" (6,000 to 8,000 soldiers, as per the recommendations of General Maxwell Taylor).¹² This directly contravened the Geneva Accords of 1954, but the administration saw no other options available to them, and no other way possible to avoid losing South Vietnam to communism.

Despite these measures, the 16,732 "support" troops stationed in Vietnam up to the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963 were of minimal effect. U.S superior technology was only of initial and limited impact, and the cautious American leader still refused to take any formal steps to bring in combat troops and invade the North. By early 1962 the Vietcong had exploded to a membership of some 300,000 individuals, and with a passive following of a further one million.¹³ This only further compounded the weakness of the corrupt and ineffectual Diem regime that had sparked controversial protests throughout the South and around the world. The United States had emerged into the position of supporting and financing a government that did not hold the confidence and support of a large number of the population. Concluding that America would not achieve success in South Vietnam with Diem in power, it was decided to abandon him. After a failed coup in August 1963 he was assassinated in November of the same year, only a few days before Kennedy's own death.¹⁴ The change in administrations marked an important development in the war that had already begun to emerge in Kennedy's final months in office- that is, the realization of the realities of the intervention and the many problems that were associated with the commitment. The situation passed on to Lyndon Johnson in 1964 was, therefore, one with "the veils torn away from the illusions of the Kennedy era and the harsh facts faced."¹⁵

The Kennedy years from 1961 to 1963 clearly suggest further reasons why the United States went to war other than the overriding desire to follow the Cold War policy of containment and prevent the fall of the "dominoes". Of most importance is the fact that Kennedy and later Johnson both entered the war with the national interests of the United States at heart. Though the Cold War induced both Presidents to often talk in ideological terms and play off the conflict as another test of "Communism versus the West", their actions were aimed at preventing the disruption in the world balance of power and status quo that they believed could be upset by the fall of South Vietnam to the communists. In the opinion of realist historian John Gaddis, the Kennedy administration identified Vietnam as an American national interest, and subsequently did its utmost to protect any threats to this interest.¹⁶ This position was best declared by Kennedy himself in 1963: "The interest of the United States of America is best served by preserving and protecting a world of diversity in which no one power or no one combination of powers can threaten the security of the United States."¹⁷  

Connected to this desire to protect the national interest was the aim of showing potential aggressors and reassuring allies that the United States was prepared to take a stand and defend her interests.¹⁸ This was especially true of Kennedy, who was determined to avoid any further humiliation and embarrassment for his administration after the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Wall crisis, and the argumentative Khrushchev at the 1961 Vienna Summit, which weighed extreme international and domestic pressures upon the President and his credibility.¹⁹Indeed, fear of humiliation was a major factor affecting the U. S response to the Indo-China conflict. Lyndon Johnson in particular later feared that if Vietnam fell to the communists, it would spark a bitter and divisive domestic debate worse than that which had followed China's change to communism, and with the potential to threaten the stability of the American democratic system.²⁰

Regardless of the contributing factors, it is of importance to note that Kennedy had no illusions about the risks involved in an American foreign intervention. In particular, the larger the American contribution, the harder it would be to keep a contingency plan for easy withdrawal available as a possibility, and the greater American prestige and credibility would be on the line. Intelligence reports clearly showed the problems that would be involved in a protracted conflict in Vietnam, but the options open to his administration of very limited involvement or withdrawal, leaving the South Vietnamese to the communists and their own independent course of action were considered unfavorable when compared with the choice to continue "pressing on".²¹

Lyndon Johnson's term in office was similarly characterized by emphasis on containing communism and preventing the "domino theory", but it also marked the first questions into the viability of such a policy.²² Johnson realized only too well, just as his predecessor Kennedy had, the risks involved in the conflict. He acted cautiously, carefully, and at times even half-heartedly in his decisions, but he never lost sight of the overriding importance of protecting the American interests in South Vietnam, and this ultimately influenced his decisions to escalate.²³ 

During the first few months of Johnson's Presidency, the situation in the South became steadily worse, especially in light of the instability of the new government- it was overthrown in a January, 1964 coup that placed General Nguyen Khanh in power. Johnson was determined that America should maintain a strong stand in Vietnam and ruled out any suggestions for withdrawal, but during his first several months in office he hesitated to make any major policy decisions and merely reaffirmed existing policy. As he stated in mid-March:  "the only realistic alternative was to do more of the same and do it more efficiently."²⁴ This reflected the fact it was an election year, but more importantly that Johnson realized the high stakes now involved in the conflict.

The first direct actions by Johnson and his administration came with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in July 1964. For several months Johnson's planners had desired a more direct approach towards the North, and the North Vietnamese attack on U. S boats prompted immediate American response to make the first bombing missions on the North. This broke the long-standing barrier against taking war to the North.²⁵ The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which followed soon after effectively gave Johnson a "blank cheque", allowing him complete discretionary powers to act in South Vietnam as he saw best, and without the requirement to continually consult Congress (though for the remainder of the year he left the majority of the Vietnam decision-making in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

Once elected in late 1964 Johnson quickly initiated a strategic and continuous bombing and retaliation program on the North, including Operations "Barrel Roll", "Flaming Dart", and the controversial "Rolling Thunder", which continued until late 1968. Unfortunately, every increase in U. S attacks was met by new communist reprisals that were gradually resulting in more American casualties (as had occurred at Bien Hoa in November 1964, and also at Pleiku, in February 1965). The limited success of these retaliatory raids, coupled with the ongoing instability of the South Vietnamese government (the Khanh government was overthrown in February) finally pressured the decision that Johnson had avoided for almost fifteen months- to turn the American involvement into an offensive one, and introduce United States combat troops to the region.²⁶

As a result on April 1, 1965, Johnson reluctantly agreed to send 20,000 combat troops to Vietnam, completely realizing the difficulties he would now face in probably having to send more troops. The decision to raise U. S troop numbers from 75,000 to 125,000 men was announced publicly on July 28, and by the end of 1965 gradual increases had enlarged the number of American combat troops in Vietnam to 184,314, and General Westmoreland had been given a freer hand in the organization and deployment of U. S troops. By the end of 1967 an astonishing 525,000 troops had been sent to Vietnam.²⁷ Throughout this period Johnson continually hesitated and stalled before consenting to the further dispatch of troops, and the number which he did send was generally far less than that which his advisors and generals had requested.

Escalation proved to have little substantial affect towards improving the American position in Vietnam- the best the United States could gain was no more than a very weak stalemate at great cost which the powerful North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces easily undermined with their intelligent strategies and environmental advantages. During this period the political situation remained unstable (the new Ky-Thieu government had emerged as the fifth since Diem's death), and American involvement increasingly sparked severe domestic and international criticism by the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968. Antiwar protests and debate had sharply intensified from 1966 amidst the mounting U. S casualties and the extension of the war, and Johnson soon found his freedom to act in Vietnam limited by the two extreme demands of withdrawal (now being suggested by some of the very advisors that two years earlier called for escalation), and further escalation (encouraged by Westmoreland and other "hawks"). Johnson was committing "slow political suicide", and he stood on middle ground between these two extremities, yet now began to contemplate a change in policy which might reduce casualties, save face for the United States, and ultimately save his Presidency.²⁸

The Tet Offensive of February 1968 was a critical turning point in the role of the United States in the Indo-China conflict, as the North Vietnamese and Vietcong made surprise attacks on the nine largest cities and thirty provincial capitals in South Vietnam. Though the uprising was soon crushed by the anti-communist forces, the Vietcong's short capture of the American embassy in Saigon and many of the brutalities of the offensive were relayed back to the United States on television. The Tet Offensive sparked a seemingly endless debate throughout Vietnam and the United States, and had the cumulative affect of collapsing any support for expansion of the war, and severely damaging the credibility of the U. S army to maintain stability in the South. As Gabriel Kolko stated, "Tet was a long-postponed confrontation with reality" for the United States.²⁹

In response to the surprise attack a weary Lyndon Johnson rejected General Westmoreland's request for a further 500,000 troops, and in a March 31 television address announced he would cease bombing of the North in order to begin searching for a peaceful resolution, whilst at the same time de-escalating American troop numbers. Finally he announced that he would not stand for Presidency at the next elections. Peace talks opened in Paris in May 1968, but it is important to note that throughout this period Johnson did not change his goal of achieving an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam. At the peace talks Johnson refused to compromise on the fundamental issues, and it was only under enormous pressure that Johnson swallowed his pride and ordered all U. S air and naval attacks be halted to facilitate the peace discussions in October. With the election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency on the promise of "Peace with Honor", the emphasis in Vietnam was shifted towards the withdrawal of American troops after 1968, and the policies of Pacification and Vietnamization.

Many important and complex reasons exist for as to why the United States achieved such little success in this period up to 1968. One school of thought suggests that the Kennedy and in particular the Johnson administrations badly miscalculated the costs that America would incur in the war, and also the willingness of the nation to pay for these costs^.30 This is certainly a logical and perhaps fundamental critique of the U. S role in Vietnam. The extended presence in Vietnam, the mounting death toll and the access of the average American to images from the war resulted in controversy, debate and the rapid expansion of the anti-war movement during the period to become a powerful influence upon America's foreign policy decisions. The financial burden of the war was huge- today it is the equivalent of some $250 billion dollars. This placed great strain upon the American economy, and over this period U. S growth and national income declined.³¹ It was difficult for the American planners to foresee such widespread opposition to the war, and even more difficult to predict that the United States would face extreme difficulties in trying to defeat the Communist forces.

It is in this respect that another reason for America's lack of success in the war can be found- she underestimated the will and ability of her enemy, and also the capabilities of American power to deal with the problem in Vietnam.³² Throughout the war the American's faced a determined enemy that was deeply committed to their cause and heavily indoctrinated with the Communist ideologies of the North.³³ The environment was one that was obviously very hostile to the United States, and their massive military and technological power was of little use in the jungles of Vietnam. The conduct of the United States during the war also contributed to its minimal successes, as it consistently alienated the Vietnamese people with the negative impact of such military activities as bombing, napalm and defoliant spraying, and also the Strategic Hamlet Program. Many Vietnamese were innocently killed, and an air of contempt clearly developed during the period as many South Vietnamese came to resent the Americans.³⁴

Central to this problem is the proposition put forward by such authors as Hans J Morgenthau that the United States lacked any cultural recognition of the Vietnamese, and that it was this kind of attitude which allowed American strategists to alienate the population by moving them or threatening their livelihoods. In particular, one criticism of the American approach was that it never took account for the political-cultural traditions of the South Vietnamese in attempting to set up stable democratic government there, failing to consider that such a political development might not be adaptable to the area.³⁵

Also closely connected to this political aspect is the argument that the United States attempted throughout the conflict to solve what was essentially a political problem with military means, and that socio-political reform rather than military action needed to have been emphasised.³⁶ The various Saigon governments were often very unstable, and most importantly often lacked any considerable popular support. Many of the regimes were corrupt and repressive (Diem), and encouraged many Southerners to turn their support towards the North. The cumulative affect of this was that the United States lacked a stable political base from which to defend itself from Communism and enact the containment policy: "Many Vietnamese refused to fight and die for this corrupt, American-backed government and its self-serving leaders. Nor would they sacrifice for the Americans, who seemed increasingly willing to take on the responsibilities of fighting and bleeding."³⁷

Perhaps the greatest error during the American escalation from 1961-1968 was that the U. S government failed to adequately deal with the questions of the viability of the containment doctrine and "domino theory". The conclusion of the war disproved both theories, as Vietnam ultimately became a unified, Communist nation (making clear the unworkability of a policy of global containment), but no "falling dominoes" followed outside of Indochina (disproving the latter theory).³⁸ As has already been mentioned, both Kennedy and Johnson consistently dismissed important intelligence reports providing alternatives to the existing policy initiatives, and which offered withdrawal without overly humiliating America, sacrificing her most important interests, and protecting her credibility.³⁹

The United States' response to the Indo-China War 1961-1968 was, therefore, one that was motivated primarily by the Cold War ideological commitments to containment and the "domino theory", intertwined with emphasis upon America's national interests and world credibility. The administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson each increased the U.S commitment, but contributing factors such as the failure to deal with the Communist guerilla warfare, the unanswered need for political reform, and domestic pressures to end the casualties and withdrawal finally forced the United States to divert its policy towards de-escalation after 1968 and end the costly, seemingly endless stalemate with the North.

The American involvement in Vietnam was extremely controversial, and generated widespread historical debate and response to the failure. Many theories concerning the American response have emerged, some calling the involvement a war in the interests of capitalism, others stating that America drew herself deeper and deeper into the conflict without realizing what she was doing, and others still claiming that the war could have been won if it were not for bureaucratic and military failings.⁴⁰ Whatever the arguments and criticisms may be, the legacy of the conflict is twofold: the vast toll of human suffering and death experienced not only by America but by the Vietnamese; and the fact that for the first real time in her history the United States did not achieve moral and material success in one of her undertakings, directly threatening the standing of the National-Liberalism, Wilsonian ideology and Cold War policy which had dominated her decision-making and popular political rhetoric for such an extended period of time.⁴¹ Today, with the prevailing conflict in Iraq before us, one cannot help but have these stark lessons of the past brought clearly to mind.
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ENDNOTES