When Sulla marched on Rome in 88, his principal justification was that he was about to deliver Rome "from her tyrants".¹ This may be true, but personalmotives behind the action also obviously did exist. Whatever the reasons put forward for the march, it is clear that at the time there was considerable opposition to his actions, and from several segments of Roman society. Keeping this in mind, however, we must also note the presence of bias in many of the ancient sources if we are to reach a viable conclusion as to whether or not Sulla's actions were justifiable.²

Sulla was awarded the consulship in 88 in recognition of his considerable achievements, along with political ally Q. Pompeius Rufus. Whilst the consulship certainly elevated the position of Sulla, it did not satisfy his ambition. Leadership of the war against Mithridates in the East would bring even greater fame, immense booty and rich spoils. As Plutarch supports, "...Sulla regarded his consulship as a very minor matter compared with future events. What fired his imagination was the thought of the war against Mithridates."³ Sulla won the leadership by lot, in competition with C. Caesar Strabo and the ageing enemy of Sulla, Marius.

That Sulla should have the right to lead the war seems justifiable enough, particularly in light of his past military achievements, and from the political aspect (as he was consul- the first citizen of Rome).⁴ The appointment left much resentment amongst Marius and his faction supporters, however, and he still sought (despite his advanced age of seventy) a way to attain the leadership.⁵ He hoped this could be achieved via an alliance with the embittered tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, whose reforms, aimed at giving the allies fairer treatment in the aftermath of the Social War, had been rejected by Sulla and his close friend Q. Pompeius. After preparing himself for the violence that would obviously follow his proposals (Sulpicius kept a band of 3,000 swordsmen and a personal bodyguard- his "anti-senate")⁶, Sulpicius released his program for reform which included the recalling of the Varian exiles, he proposed that no senator should have debts exceeding 2,000 denarii, and that the Italians and freedmen should be distributed amongst all the tribes.

As was expected, Sulpicius' proposals led to rioting and fighting between his own supporters and the senate and old citizens protecting their privileges. It soon became apparent, asserts Keaveney, as the day for the voting on Sulpicius' legislation came near, that he was using force and persuasion to attain support for his programme.⁷ Sulla and Pompeius declared a "feriae", a suspension of business activities, in order to delay the voting, however this only encouraged further violence, in which Pompeius' son was killed in the Forum, and Sulla and Pompeius were forced to annul the feriae and leave the city. Sulpicius passed his "ruinous laws"⁸ , and at this point announced the transfer of leadership from Sulla to Marius, who had no right to the position.

In light of this great humiliation Sulla appealed to his army to support him as consul in restoring order, and with six legions he marched on Rome. After some resistance Marius and Sulpicius were forced to flee Rome, and along with ten others were declared outlaws. Sulpicius was captured and killed soon after whilst Marius fled to Africa. Sulpicius' laws were repealed, and Sulla set about instituting a number of laws that were aimed at strengthening the senate.⁹

Whilst Sulla had clearly removed laws that were in opposition to the best interests of the Senate, many people at the time did not believe that he had been justified in marching on Rome. Opposition to his actions came not only the Senate, but from some parts of the army, from his own faction, and from the larger population. Armed troops were not permitted within the city of Rome (except during a triumph), and Sulla had violated the ritually consecrated city boundary- the pomerium, "...an act beside which the excesses of Sulpicius and Marius paled in comparison. Partisan politics were thus forgotten in the face of such sacrilege."¹⁰

Sulla had the support of his army in the march because they were effectively one of the first professional armies, holding their allegiance not to Rome, but to their general.¹¹ The radical extent of his action is clearly shown however, in the fact that all but one of Sulla's officers (L. Licinius Lucullus) deserted him. Plutarch tells us that the Senate was furious with Sulla, yet kept their feelings hidden.¹² His march on Rome had undermined the authority of the Senate, their oldest and most traditional beliefs, and he had turned away all of the ambassadors it sent out in an attempt to convince him to stop. Just as similarly the people were by no means in favour of his use of a personal army to take control of the city, and many were probably resentful at having lost some of their number in the attack.¹³ Furthermore, despite his previous actions, it was hard for the people to accept that Marius, praised as one of the great founders of Rome, had been forced into the position of having to flee for his life abroad. The best evidence of the people's lack of support for Sulla lies once again in Plutarch, where he tells us that they deliberately rejected his candidates for office.¹⁴

Obviously few people at the time could find any justification for Sulla's actions, despite the unpopular activities of Sulpicius and Marius. I am in agreement with Arthur Keaveney, however, in stating that to a large degree Sulla was justified in his actions, as extreme as they were. Via the use of violence Sulpicius and Marius had forced the feriae to be cancelled, and subsequently forced their legislation upon the people. The role of the Roman consuls had been severely undermined, and "they had, like the Gracchi, established a personal domination over Rome, and so it fell to the chief magistrate to act and bring this state of affairs to a speedy end."¹⁵ Evidence also suggests that Sulla's march was not a planned, premeditated action, but rather a hesitant, and desperate maneuver. Sulla also expressed a willingness to meet and talk with Sulpicius and Marius, but this never eventuated.¹⁶

Unfortunately the arguments in favour of his march are always clouded by Sulla's personal motivations behind the attack, and it is difficult to determine if he was sincere in his statement that he was removing tyranny from Rome, and not simply protecting his career. On a personal level, Sulla's "dignitas had of course suffered a serious affront"¹⁷ , and he would have believed that his actions (extreme as they were) were justified in protecting his own interests and ambitions. These personal motivations are most clearly apparent in the vengeful act of declaring twelve of his opponents outlaws, and even more so by the killing of the tribune Sulpicius whilst he was still in office.

The greatest impact of Sulla's action was that it laid the precedent for future actions of a similar nature, under the guise that they were also acting with the best interests of Rome in mind.¹⁸ Sulla, Marius and Sulpicius together carried on the practice of violence in politics that had began with the Gracchi, and for this reason they perhaps contributed a little further towards the decline of the Roman Republic. Reasons both for and against Sulla's march on Rome in 88 clearly exist, but perhaps Levick best sums up in stating that "Sulla's victory was justifiable; the way he used it unforgivably vindictive."¹⁹

Endnotes:

1. Appian (translated by Horace White), Civil Wars , Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, Book 1, ch.57, p.107.
2. As Badian comments, Sulla's "... far from unbiased" autobiography "... was one of the main sources of information of his later biographer Plutarch, and has left noticeable traces in Appian and (as far as we can tell) in Livy.", in Ernst Badian "Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer", in Dunston, A.J., (ed) Essays on Roman Culture, Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Company, 1976, p.36.
3. Plutarch, "The Life Of Lucius Sulla", in The Fall of the Roman Republic, Penguin Books, 1976, Ch.7, p.74.
4. Badian, op.cit., pp.47-48.
5. Plutarch tells us that Marius was "...under the influence of those never-ageing passions, love of distinction and a mania for fame" and was bitter at being overlooked for many years. In Plutarch, op.cit., p.74.
6. Arthur Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican, Croom Helm Books, 1982, p.59.
7. Ibid., p.60.
8. Livy, Periochae (Summaries), Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass., 1987, Book 77, p.96.
9. For a complete account of these laws that were of great benefit to the Senate, see Keaveney, op.cit., pp.68-69.
10. Ibid., p.64.
11. Sulla's army did not support him "... because they felt that they owed their senatorial commander any ideological or class loyalty, rather that he had something to offer them: the spoils of Asia." In B.M Levick, "Sulla's March on Rome in 88 B.C", Historia 31 (1982), p.505.
12. Plutarch, op.cit., p.78.
13. "In his anger he (Sulla) had lost control of his actions; all that he could see was his enemies and he gave no consideration to friends, relations, and old acquaintances... he knew no distinction between the innocent and the guilty." Ibid., p.77.
14. Sulla also faced opposition in the form of the new consul Lucius Cinna. Ibid., p.79.
15. Keaveney, op.cit., p.65.
16. Ibid., p.65.
17. M.Crawford, The Roman Republic, Humanities Press Inc, 1978, p.146.
18. This claim would later be used by M.Lepidis, Caesar, and Octavius. Ibid., p.147.
19. Levick, op.cit., p.508.

References:

Appian (translated by Horace White), Civil Wars , Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, Book 1.

Livy, Periochae (Summaries), Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass., 1987.

Plutarch, The Fall of the Roman Republic, Penguin Books, 1976.

Vellius Paterculus, Roman History, Book 2, Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

Crawford, M., The Roman Republic, Humanities Press Inc, 1978.

Dunston, A.J., (ed) Essays on Roman Culture, Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Company, 1976.

Keaveney, A., Sulla: The Last Republican, 1982.

Levick, B.M., "Sulla's March on Rome in 88 B.C", Historia 31 (1982) 503-508.